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Is financial stability policy now better placed 
to prevent systemic banking crises? 
Agustin Villar 
Introduction 
Widespread bank failures have severe implications for the economy. Wherever the banking system 
collapses, output falls sharply and the economy takes a long time to recover (Honohan (1996)). 
Moreover, bank failures build up political pressures for the government to intervene and rescue banks; 
in some instances political imperatives have replaced economic efficiency and led to the 
nationalisation of the banking system (Brock (1992)). Furthermore, banking crises have often occurred 
in conjunction with balance of payments crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart (1995)). This is nowhere truer 
than in emerging market countries, where banks remain at the centre of the financial system. For all 
these reasons, it is of utmost importance to build up a sound and stable banking system. 
The first section of this paper introduces the case for and elements of a financial stability policy. The 
second looks at the issue of bank risk-taking and the way in which supervisory oversight deals with it. 
The third section summarises deposit insurance practices across countries, and the last provides an 
overview of responses to the operation of a lender of last resort. 
1.  Banks and financial stability 
Banks are central to the working of a monetary economy. They play a crucial role in the provision of 
transaction services and the administration of a country’s payment system; they are the natural 
suppliers of liquidity to firms and households; and they are a main conduit for monetary policy 
(Corrigan (1982)). The prominent role of banks in a monetary economy ensures that bank failures - 
and in particular those that happen in tandem - carry real consequences. 
Banks’ balance sheets are unique in their financial structure. Banks issue liquid, nominally valued 
liabilities, many of which are payable on demand at par, and they mainly acquire assets that are 
illiquid, relatively difficult to value, and of longer maturity than their liabilities (Lindgren et al (1996)). 
Most businesses do not carry the degree of leverage that banks show in their balance sheets.
1 This 
comparatively high leverage ratio originates in the role that banks play in the transformation of debt 
issued by firms and other borrowers into demand deposits, saving deposits and other assets 
demanded for households.
2 
A thorough understanding of the risks that arise from banks’ operating environment, and the risk 
transformations that take place in their balance sheets, is critical for the design and implementation of 
financial stability policies in banking systems. Goldstein (1997) asserts that banks in emerging 
economies face relatively high credit and market risks; and that there have been several instances 
when banks (or banking systems) have suffered from an undue degree of risk concentration. The 
structure of the economy (eg taste, technology, endowments and the nature of shocks) might place 
some constraint on the scope for risk diversification in emerging economies; but bank failures are also 
the result of inadequate risk-taking, weak or negligent management and fraud. Maintaining adequate 
levels of capital can help to overcome some of these difficulties. 
                                                       
1    This assertion should be qualified. Commercial firms that show a debt/equity ratio in excess of two and a half would 
normally receive a speculative credit rating. By contrast, in the case of banks a ratio of 10 is considered highly conservative. 
For more details see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Table 2.3, page 23. 
2   Although other financial intermediaries are growing, their size and dynamism have not yet challenged the central role of 
banks in emerging economies. 100  BIS Papers No 28
 
Macroeconomic volatility and capital 
Although emerging economies are exposed to large shocks, the succession of banking crises during 
the last 30 years suggests that fundamental bank weaknesses have been severe. In fact, they have 
often been too severe to be solved by a turnaround in the economy, implying that the underlying 
structural problems also need to be addressed. Nevertheless, BIS (2005) notes that cyclical factors 
have contributed considerably to the recently improved banking sector performance. The main 
channel identified is the increased ability of governments to support banks. 
Dealing with macroeconomic volatility is a priority to strengthen banking systems, and some progress 
has been made in this regard. A stable fiscal policy contributed to the supply of long-term funding to 
the financial system in Chile, and the stabilisation of the economy was a crucial factor in the recovery 
of banks in Mexico (See contributions by Moreno, by Betancour, De Gregorio and Jara and by Sidaoui 
in this volume).  
Other factors can also play a role. First, a large foreign bank participation helps to shift abroad part of 
the economic losses of an adverse domestic shock. However, foreign banks can become a channel of 
transmission of foreign shocks to the domestic economy, and their presence can also threaten the 
solvency of domestic banks. The country experiences reviewed in Sidaoui, Betancour et al and Pesce 
provide some support to the idea that foreign banks have contributed to a more competitive business 
environment. Second, capital markets or other markets can help mitigate credit risk. For example, 
banks exposed to booming housing prices can sell bonds secured by those loans. A difficulty here has 
been the relatively small size of capital markets in emerging economies, although this might now be 
changing.
3 The paper by Zamani in this volume provides an explanation of how policy has sought to 
develop a diversified financial landscape. Third, the holding of higher levels of capital can compensate 
for a more volatile operating environment. In particular, capital provides a greater safety margin in the 
event of shocks and reduces the likelihood of bank failure. Other channels are discussed below. While 
10 years ago banks in emerging economies - with several notable exceptions - chose not to raise 
capital ratios with this end in mind (Goldstein (1997)), more recently bank capital ratios have risen in 
several emerging economies (BIS (2005)). Graph 1 presents bank capital ratios for different regions 
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Note: Unweighted averages of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia for Latin America, and Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand for 
Asia. 
1 Volatilities are averages of the periods 1995–99 and 2000–04.    2 Measured as the annual change in consumer prices, in per cent. 
Sources: Central banks; IMF and IMF staff estimates; national data.
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3   For further discussion of issues raised in this paragraph see background notes for this meeting: “Banks and aggregate 
credit: what is new?”, “Changing nature of risks facing banks” and “Privatisation, consolidation and the increased role of 
foreign banks”. See also Goldstein and Turner (1996). BIS Papers No 28  101
 
Incentives for risk-taking and capital 
Another consideration is imperfect information and its impact on the structure of banks’ balance 
sheets. This structure would not matter in a world where shareholders, depositors and borrowers 
shared perfect information about all aspects of the economy.
4 In this world, banks’ portfolios would just 
replicate the market portfolio and the constellation of risks in the portfolios would be that of the 
underlying economy. In the real market, however, if banks wish to undertake riskier projects they are 
likely to pay higher interest rates to compensate depositors for greater risks. Avery et al (1988) and 
Park (1995) find evidence that wholesale bank depositors can demand higher interest from banks that 
undertake riskier ventures. But there is no evidence that small depositors behave in this way. 
Monitoring bank managers is costly. Small depositors do not normally have the necessary capabilities, 
either to collect and analyse information or to intervene in bank management, and they might not have 
the incentive to do so. However, small depositors would expect to benefit from the information 
collected by other depositors on banks’ activities. There is a serious free-rider problem here. 
Moreover, because depositors or other small creditors share the same incentives, the information 
produced as part of the monitoring of banks’ activities would be of limited use in helping to reveal their 
underlying risks.
5 
In the presence of information asymmetries, the structure of capital is a key determinant of bank 
performance. Because it affects the behaviour of different claimholders (eg management, equity 
holders, depositors, etc) capital is key to solving the incentive problem that they have. In particular, 
equity holders fear that the decisions taken by firms’ management might have a negative impact on 
their wealth. A higher capital (or equity stake) has the potential to encourage equity holders to monitor 
firms’ management more effectively. 
Capital could also enhance bank resilience in the event of contagion or spillover. For example, claims 
on banks normally make up a large proportion of the wealth of households and, in the event of doubts 
about the soundness of a bank, small depositors might well be inclined to withdraw deposits. This can 
discipline managers who behave imprudently (Calomiris and Kahn (1991)). To the extent that the 
interbank market works properly, the movement of deposits between banks could provide peer 
assessments on banks’ risk profiles. But if deposits leave banks, this may also lead to bank runs 
spreading amongst banks that share certain similarities (eg line of business, geographic areas or 
ownership) or even to an indiscriminate run on banks.  
Moreover, banks share a large proportion of transactions amongst themselves on a daily basis. 
Changes in the liquidity position of one (large) bank would affect the financial position of all its 
counterparties and cause system-wide financial instability. This is often referred to as the “too big to 
fail” dilemma, but it may be not only size-dependent but also “context-dependent” (Freixas et al 
(1999)).
6 
2.  Prudential regulation and supervisory oversight 
While banks are vulnerable to a variety of shocks, it is important to bear in mind that one of their key 
functions is to pool credit risks by diversifying their portfolios. Banks are thus a conduit for better risk-
sharing in the economy.
7 However, risk pooling by banks does not make risk disappear. Indeed, if 
banks do not manage risk correctly it may even lead to its concentration where diversification is low. 
                                                       
4   This is normally referred to in the literature as the Modigliani-Miller theorem. See Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
5   Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). The argument hinges on the inability of depositors to observe a clear signal in the actions of 
managers. Some argue that forcing bank management to disclose more and better information about operations restores 
market discipline (Caprio and Honohan (2004)). 
6   See discussion of interbank markets in the background note for this meeting “Changing nature of risks facing banks”. 
7   Such pooling also allows banks to specialise. Part of the benefits of this accrue to firms. The benefits are large in terms of 
economic welfare as financial deepening is positively associated with economic growth and development. 102  BIS Papers No 28
 
The correct assessment of risk in bank portfolios is therefore crucial to preserving the stability of the 
banking sector. But better risk management has not always been a priority for policymakers. Banks 
might allow an urgent “need” to generate revenue (Sheng (1996)) to cause them to act imprudently, 
aware that it is costly to monitor their activities and in the expectation of a bailout should the worst 
happen. Sprong (1990) asserts that control of banking risks becomes a way of limiting claims on 
deposit insurance and thus making such insurance workable. Some time ago Rojas-Suarez and 
Weisbrod (1996) observed that internal incentive systems for risk management were not a priority for 
supervisors. From another viewpoint, Barth et al (2002) suggest that bad design of regulation and 
supervision weakens incentives to manage risks well. 
Recent crises appear to have increased awareness of the importance of policies to improve risk 
management in banks in emerging markets. On the basis of the questionnaire responses summarised 
in the Table in Appendix A, the following three sections discuss how prudential regulation and the 
supervisory framework try to enhance risk management.
8 
Risk concentration and connected lending 
In most emerging economies there is regulatory action to prevent risk concentration in bank portfolios. 
Quantitative limits on lending to a single borrower,
9 on holdings of securities, and on lending to related 
parties are commonly applied. In general, risk concentration is defined as a percentage of bank 
capital; although in Latin America lending limits are reported as a share of a borrower’s net worth. 
The lending limit for loans to a single borrower is commonly set at 25% of bank capital, although there 
are countries where it is below this percentage (eg India and Venezuela). In some exceptional cases, 
the limit is as high as 40% of bank capital. In other countries total lending to large borrowers is limited 
to a certain multiple of bank capital (between five and eight times) or a share of the loan portfolio 
(half). 
Investments (eg private equity holding or placement of securities) are generally excluded from the limit 
to a single borrower and are subject to lower limits. For several countries it is not clear whether 
government borrowing from banks is subject to the same limits. 
Lending to related parties or controlling interests is commonly permitted but subject to limits. Only a 
few countries do not allow it at all. These limits are generally tighter than those set for any single 
borrower but they have been set at the same level in a few cases. In several countries lending to 
controlling interests must be disclosed. In Malaysia and Venezuela, lending to related parties or 
controlling interests is forbidden. 
Bank supervisors monitor large exposures on a regular basis; credit registries and on-site examination 
are a critical element. It is not clear whether this is consistent across different supervisory authorities, 
but most countries report on-site inspections at least once a year. 
Credit quality 
In recent years, credit quality has become an area in which banks in emerging economies can show 
improvement in risk management. In some cases, regulators have provided guidelines or formal 
instructions for the way bank lending activities should be conducted. Today it is very often the case 
that banks in most emerging economies have proper loan approval processes and credit committees 
overseeing the implementation of their lending policies. This was not the case some years ago. 
But there are still problems. Liberal reporting and treatment of non-performing loans and renegotiated 
debt remains a problem. An adequate loan classification requires that the debtor’s financial position be 
considered, comprising an assessment of its net worth, cash flow, collateral and payment history.
10 
                                                       
8   What follows concentrates on credit risk, which is the main source of risk for banks in emerging markets. See background 
note “Changing nature of risks facing banks”. 
9   Across most economies there is a broad definition of borrower: a single person or firm, or a group of them with economic 
links deep enough to make them economically dependent on each other. 
10   Goldstein (1997) argues that these should be the main elements of credit analysis. BIS Papers No 28  103
 
Chile is the only country reporting that banks classify loans according to the credit rating of the 
borrower. In Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, credit and collateral analysis are fully incorporated into 
loan classification. But in many countries the main criterion remains the repayment of loans. 
At least three countries report that asset quality plays a central role in their supervisory assessment of 
banks. This is achieved by application of the CAMEL methodology
11 in Chile, Hong Kong and Korea. 
For other countries it is not clear to what extent the bank examination process fosters a better 
assessment of a bank’s lending policy. However, a number of countries conduct off-site examinations 
of bank loans and makes use of centralised credit registries, whereby information about banks’ loan 
portfolios is reported on a monthly basis. At least eight countries report having such registries in 
operation. 
Overall, there appear to have been significant improvements in policies to assess asset quality but 
there are still relatively large gaps relative to best practices.
12 
Loan loss provisions 
Provisioning rules are a meaningful way to manage risks when the value of assets does not carry a 
market price. However, loan provisioning is still mostly dependent on actual loan repayments and does 
not take into account the current repayment capacity of borrowers and their past behaviour. Loan 
provisions based on actual repayments may thus encourage “evergreening” of bad loans. Several 
countries also report that they apply provisioning rules that differentiate between several types of loans 
with possible negative implications for asset quality. 
In only a handful of emerging economies do banks apply portfolio models to compute loan loss 
provisions based on the statistical properties exhibited by such portfolios. In these cases, loss 
provisions are related to the expected loss in a loan portfolio. In general this approach applies to 
relatively large and diversified parts of the loan portfolio; most notably, mortgage and consumer 
lending. 
As discussed further in a companion background note for this meeting,
13 the application of portfolio 
model techniques to estimate the need for loan loss provisions requires histories of portfolio 
performance and information about the distribution of risks amongst the universe of borrowers. In 
emerging economies, lack of information and structural changes make this a difficult task. To this end, 
credit registries could make a central contribution to the assessment of credit risk. In general, 
supervisors hold veto power on the implementation of portfolio methods for the computation of loss 
provisions or they retain the power to demand greater provisions if they do not agree with the model 
results. 
Banks and capital regulation 
The regulation of capital and its oversight by supervisors are important components of financial 
stability policies in a market economy. Demanding more capital for greater risk-taking aligns 
shareholders’ incentives with the interests of less informed creditors. The regulation of capital in the 
banking industry must then balance two objectives: (i) allowing for a healthy and competitive banking 
system; while (ii)  providing an incentive scheme that brings greater discipline to the way banking 
activity is conducted. Any regulation on capital faces the challenge of ensuring compliance. Moreover, 
how to deal with a generalised undercapitalisation of the banking sector remains a sensitive issue. 
The regulation of capital in banking systems in emerging economies has evolved over the last 
10 years. Nowadays, it is fast converging to the standards in existence amongst industrial economies. 
In a list of 16 emerging economies, all have adopted a regulatory approach that follows the standard 
                                                       
11   A bank examination methodology that rates banks based on their capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings 
and liquidity. 
12   Kane (1995) highlights the constraints that poor information systems have placed on efforts to exercise due diligence in 
granting new loans and monitoring outstanding ones. 
13   “Changing nature of risks facing banks”. 104  BIS Papers No 28
 
set in the Basel Capital Accord of 1988.
14 This convergence in regulatory frameworks in emerging 
economies is quite remarkable. 
What are the reasons? On the one hand, this is the outcome of national experimentation with different 
forms of banking regulation rather than the result of a supranational agreement as was the case for 
the large industrial economies. The degree of economic and financial integration between those 
economies in providing an incentive to seek a common capital framework should not be 
underestimated. The impulse for convergence might also have come from several other forces: capital 
markets searching for a familiar approach, oversight by rating agencies, peer pressure, or “beauty 
contests”. On the other hand, the development of supranational standards in the late 1990s and a 
related voluntary assessment process might have made governments aware of the need to revise their 
own national frameworks.
15 
One consequence of convergence is that differences in the regulatory framework are less likely to alter 
the competitive edge of banking firms. Is this important for domestic banks in emerging economies? 
Arguably the answer at present is no, except for some economies with important intraregional banking 
relations. Most of the papers dealing with country experiences in this volume make reference to 
different issues as a source of a competitive edge but not to differences in the way the industry is 
regulated. A  more important consequence at this juncture is that convergence has established a 
common capital framework that centres on credit and market risks. This has helped to promote greater 
emphasis on risk management in the banking business in emerging economies. Table 1 presents 
evidence on the universal use of credit and market risks as a yardstick for capital ratios in emerging 
economies. To the extent that the capital ratios increase with greater risk-taking, the framework can 
help banks in emerging economies keep risk under control. But this is not a foregone conclusion. 
Goldstein (1997) presents two common criticisms of the framework: (i) it does not require banks 
operating in more volatile environments to hold higher capital; and (ii) the significance of meeting the 
capital adequacy ratio is reduced if other elements of the prudential and supervisory framework are 
substandard. The paper by Betancour et al (2006) in this volume draws attention to the “pre-
conditions” required for a capital framework to work adequately. 
The common framework has incorporated two important elements into the regulation of capital in 
emerging markets: (i) a rule-based approach in the assessment and quantification of risks; and 
(ii)  allowance (although limited) for the risk properties of bank assets. The rule-based approach 
imposes on banks the criteria for the assessment and quantification of risks and preserves some 
discretion for the regulator to alter this quantification. This discretion is conceptually an important issue 
because it puts a powerful tool in the hands of the regulator in emerging economies. 
The rule-based approach incorporates risk weights associated with different components of bank 
assets. By determining these, the regulator is passing judgment on the nature and relative importance 
of the risks the banking sector can bear. In a sense the regulator substitutes for bank management in 
the judgment of risks. Given the structure of the risk weights, the supervisor can adjust the minimum 
amount of required capital to the riskiness of the whole bank portfolio. 
Assessing risk weights is not a trivial issue in emerging economies. The risk weights embedded in the 
rule-based approach have generally been taken from the international blueprint for the regulation of 
capital. From conceptual and practical points of view this is somewhat puzzling because emerging 
economies tend to differ in their economic structure and the constellation of risks might well be 
different. Moreover, emerging markets are generally more vulnerable to financial shocks. As a result of 
these differences, their economies tend to be more volatile; that is, prices and quantities record larger 
changes in response to a shock than would be the case in developed economies. This would seem to 
call for some differentiation of risk weights. Prima facie, there would be a case for banks in emerging 
economies to hold greater capital if the probability of bank failure was more likely to have real-side 
effects than in a developed economy with more diversified sources of finance. 
                                                       
14   The Capital Accord dated 1988, and modified in 1996, was developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It 
was originally intended to apply to international banks but was extended to all banks in the European Union and later 
developed into an international standard. 
15   The Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) and the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) 




  Prudential capital 
requirement (in %) 
Total capital 








Argentina …  12.3  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Brazil …  …    …    …    … 
Chile   8  13.6 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Colombia   9    10.8 
3 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mexico   8  14.1  Yes  Yes  No 
Peru …  …    …    …    … 
Venezuela  12  12.5  Yes  Yes  Yes 
China   8  … Yes Yes Yes 
India   9  13.4  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Hong Kong SAR    8  15.4  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Singapore  10  16.1  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Indonesia   8  19.4  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Korea   8  12.4  Yes Yes Yes 
Malaysia  8  14.3  Yes  Yes  No 
Philippines …  …    …    …    … 
Thailand   8.5  13.1  Yes  Yes  No 
Czech Republic    8  12.6  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Hungary   8  13.2  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Poland   8  15.4  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Israel   9  10.8 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Russia   10 
2 …  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Saudi Arabia    8  18  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Turkey   8  28.8  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note:  na = no answer or not applicable. 
1  Taken from questionnaire responses.   
2  Banks with equity greater than EUR 5 million, otherwise 11%.   
2  For 1999. 
Source: Central banks. 
 
Several countries have adjusted the common framework to their specific needs. First, a few countries 
have modified the risk weights for some assets in bank portfolios. In Chile and Hong Kong SAR, 
regulators have applied greater risk weights for mortgage loans; likewise, Venezuela reported that risk 
weights for government bond holdings were to be positive rather than zero. Second, a number of 
countries have imposed greater capital adequacy ratios on their banks. Table 1 shows that at least 
seven countries demand a capital adequacy ratio for their banks that is greater than 8%. 
The regulation on capital does not take into account the overall portfolio risk faced by the bank. Since 
asset correlation is not taken into account, the allocation of assets embedded in the capital rule might 
not be efficient. For example, in industrial countries government bonds have a zero risk weight. The 
logical underpinning is that credit risk is low and stable, that government bonds are a safe haven in the 
event of falling risk aversion and that their return is negatively correlated with other banks’ assets. 
However, in emerging economies these assumptions might not hold: sovereigns have defaulted, and 
sovereign debt returns are positively correlated with most other assets. 
The introduction of the market risk amendment to the Capital Accord in 1996 was a first step away 
from a prescriptive rule-based approach towards models in requiring the specific quantification of risk. 106  BIS Papers No 28
 
This development had important consequences. In 2004 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
published a revised framework.
16 The new framework still does not require the use of a risk portfolio 
model to compute capital adequacy ratios, but it makes explicit measurement of credit risk the central 
element for calculations of capital requirements. Moreover, although it established a rule-based 
approach, it envisaged the supervisory authority being able to demand an adjustment of the perceived 
capital requirement at its discretion. The need for this could be determined by the results of stress 
testing, deficiencies in risk management, or lack of internal controls. 
Notwithstanding the convergence in the regulatory framework already noted, there remain some 
differences in the supervision of bank capital across countries. First, there are differences in the extent 
to which capital adequacy ratios incorporate credit and market risks. Interest rate risk is less prevalent 
in the computation of capital adequacy ratios than is credit risk. Second, there are differences in the 
frameworks used for bank regulation. For example, consolidated supervision is not universal since, in 
a few cases, bank regulators do not have the legal right to apply it.
17 
3. Deposit  insurance 
Deposit insurance is another central element of financial stability policies. Its presence reduces the 
incentive of bank depositors to withdraw their money all at once and bring down the bank. By 
increasing depositor confidence, deposit insurance has the potential to provide for a more stable 
banking system. But it also has its downside: as with any insurance scheme, it reduces an element of 
market discipline. Because depositors do not face the costs in case of a bank failure, it might reduce 
their incentive to monitor bank activities.  
Most major emerging economies have adopted deposit insurance schemes. Nevertheless, such 
schemes are not universal and still have not been adopted in Chile, China, Israel or Saudi Arabia (see 
Table in Appendix B). Singapore has recently decided to introduce deposit insurance and has already 
laid down the details of how it might operate. Countries that do not have a deposit insurance scheme 
have in general kept a considerable role for the central bank in financing the repayment of deposits to 
depositors in failed banks. In general central banks can advance funds to the liquidators secured with 
assets from the failed bank. 
Several deposit insurance schemes offer only limited coverage as a means to prevent moral hazard.
18 
To avoid excessive risk-taking, schemes in most emerging economies tend to be limited in their scope 
and coverage. Thus, they seek to protect small depositors fully while leaving large depositors covered 
only partially. Extending insurance to the smaller (and more numerous) depositors has the potential to 
reduce the incidence of bank runs. Arguably, deposit insurance provides for less market discipline. 
The limits on coverage are quite variable between countries, and this is probably due to both general 
and idiosyncratic elements. Differences in income per capita across countries matter: wealthier 
countries are likely to offer comparatively greater insurance in nominal terms. Idiosyncratic factors - 
like the past experience of a banking crisis - could also result in a higher coverage ratio. Some 
countries do not extend deposit insurance to branches of foreign banks, but do so in the case of 
foreign bank subsidiaries. Other countries do not make such a distinction. 
Deposit insurance schemes may be funded privately (through contributions from banks) or from 
recourse to the government purse. Most commonly, participating banks are asked to make a 
contribution. When this is the case, contributions are based on the amount of deposits insured. There 
has also been a shift towards considering the risk profile of the bank: those with riskier business who 
are therefore more likely to tap the deposit insurance scheme are likely to pay higher fees. Examples 
include Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Hungary, Poland and Turkey. This raises some interesting issues 
                                                       
16   The document is entitled International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework. 
17   This is reported in the case of Thailand, although legal modifications are being tried. 
18   Caprio et al (2002) provide evidence that deposit insurance generosity is positively correlated with bank fragility. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002) show that deposit insurance generosity predicts future banking crises. BIS Papers No 28  107
 
about the complementary nature of deposit insurance premia and risk-weighted capital adequacy 
ratios. 
While the rationale for deposit insurance is clear, there are some thorny issues that arise in the case of 
systemic banking problems. In general, deposit insurance will not have the resources needed to pay 
out a large proportion of bank deposits. This poses problems of credibility for the deposit insurance 
system if the banking problem is regarded as large. Systemic banking crises in emerging economies 
also tend to be associated with an increase in sovereign risk, which further threatens the credibility of 
the insurance guarantee. In cases where depositors cannot distinguish between sound and troubled 
banks, the deposit insurance scheme is then likely to lose its effectiveness, and the banking system 
may destabilise easily (Levy Yeyati et al (2004)). 
4.  Lender of last resort 
In many countries financial stability policies include a lender of last resort for the banking system. 
Banks are exposed to a great extent to liquidity risk (the risk that the cost of adjusting financial 
positions will increase substantially or that they will lose access to financing). This is particularly the 
case because banking is a heavily leveraged business and many banks’ assets are illiquid. If 
depositors decide to exchange their deposits into cash, the banking system will need a source of 
external liquidity. The loss of deposits in one bank cannot be dealt with by borrowing from other banks 
because their liquidity does not increase when deposits are exchanged for cash. 
Problems in the functioning of the interbank market can also pose a risk for systemic liquidity. 
Normally, banks keep liquid assets in the form of cash or a balance in an account at the central bank. 
Alternatively they may have deposits with other banks or access to borrowing from them. The 
interbank market allows banks to recycle liquidity amongst themselves. However, at some point the 
interbank market may not work properly. Interbank market failures arise in general from imperfect 
information about the true health of a bank or increased risks that make banks less willing to lend. 
The failure of a large bank, or a number of smaller ones, can have systemic implications. The nature 
of banking credit relations determines that a large group of households and firms might not be able to 
obtain financing. This might reverberate through the financial system. In this vein, a bank run can 
affect the functioning of the payment system. Bank liabilities dominate as means of exchange but 
finality is only achieved when a means of payment is exchanged in settlement for customer 
transactions. For this reason banks daily clear large amounts of liabilities relative to their stock of 
assets. While an essentially bilateral commitment, these operations are frequently settled on a 
multilateral basis. Disruptions in the settlement of a bank’s liabilities can have a knock-on effect on 
other banks.  
Real-time payment systems eliminate these exposures between banks. However, if the central bank 
provides uncollateralised intraday liquidity to facilitate the process, it then takes on the credit risk. In 
recent years there has been a move towards real-time gross settlement systems for interbank 
payments and central bank lending has been collateralised. Under these circumstances, the lender of 
last resort can just stand ready to purchase high-quality marketable assets from banks’ portfolios. 
Banks will keep them in their portfolios as they internalise the risk of an illiquid portfolio (Goodfriend 
and King (1988)). 
But there are other instances where a lender of last resort is required to lend on less secured terms, 
involving the central bank taking onto its balance sheet the illiquid assets of banks in exchange for 
liquidity. James (1991) provides evidence that the liquidation value of a bank is lower than its market 
value. It is then possible that in the case of bank insolvency - and because of the divergences in 
valuation cited by James - the central bank would be taking on a significant risk. 
Historically, the central bank has provided the function of lender of last resort for banks although this 
has also involved risk capital support for banks. This raises some issues concerning financial stability. 
If the lender of last resort reduces the liquidity risk that banks face, its presence might reduce the 
incentive of banks to keep adequate levels of liquidity. This raises the possibility that the involvement 
of the central bank increases moral hazard. One way to address this is to limit lending to a short period 
of time. This may provide the “breathing space” that a sound but illiquid bank might need. A second 
way is to impose borrowing limits. Table 2 shows that most central banks in emerging economies 
impose limits on lending to banks. In most cases the limits are on the amounts borrowed but several 108  BIS Papers No 28
 
also impose limits on the length of the lending period. Some countries report no limits to borrowing but 




Lender of last resort 
  Borrowing limits 
(yes/no or details) 






Argentina …  …    … 
Brazil …  …    … 
Chile  Yes. Limit of 90 days  …  Yes 
Colombia Yes  Overnight rate + 1%  Yes 
Mexico Yes  Market  rate  Yes 
Peru …  …    … 
Venezuela  No. Amount of reserve 
requirements affects credit 
extended 
Market rate + spread (not 
defined) 
Yes 
China  Yes   2.25% in most cases  Yes 
India Yes  Repo  rate/bank rate  Yes 
Hong Kong SAR  Yes. Limit of 100-200% of capital 
base and up to HKD 10 billion 
Base rate + margin based on 
market conditions 
 … 
Singapore  Yes  Market rate + margin  Yes 
Indonesia Collateralised  …  Yes 
Korea Yes  3%  Yes 
Malaysia Collateralised  …  Yes 
Philippines …  …    … 
Thailand  Yes. On a case by case basis  The higher of 1-day repo rate or 
average minimum loan rate of 
5 largest banks 
Yes 
Czech Republic  No. Limits on maturity  Money market rate + margin 
(depends on collateral) 
Yes, but depends 
on bank’s financial 
situation 
Hungary  No. Based on collateral  O/N rate + 0.5-2%    No 
Poland  No. Based on collateral  Lombard rate    No 
Israel  Based on collateral  …  Yes 
Russia Yes  Market  rate    … 
Saudi Arabia  No  …    … 
Turkey  Yes, in most cases. Based on 
collateral 
Money market rate  Yes 
Note: … = no answer or not applicable. 
Source: Central banks. 
 
Borrowing at punitive rates could also help in curtailing moral hazard; but punitive lending is less 
common. In general central banks charge market interest rates. It is also true that a higher interest 
rate might just end up sinking an illiquid bank or encourage greater risk-taking by its managers. BIS Papers No 28  109
 
Most countries report that borrowing from the rediscount window prompts corrective action (Table 2). 
The nature of the supervisory action may vary but the prospects of opening the doors to the 
intervention of the regulator might be a powerful deterrent to imprudent behaviour.
19 Conditioning 
liquidity assistance on prompt corrective actions might provide for some constructive ambiguity. This is 
effectively ambiguity about whether liquidity intervention will in fact take place, about the terms for 
assistance and about the penalties. The downside of constructive ambiguity is that it places 
considerable discretion in the hands of the agency responsible for crisis management. 
 
                                                       






























Lending limit of 25% of bank 
capital for borrower. Exceptions 
apply. 
HKMA does not 
prescribe rules. 
Borrower can be 
pooled in risk 
categories and 
provisioned as a single 
borrower. 
  Lending to related parties limited to 5% of 
borrower’s net worth. Total lending to related 
parties cannot exceed 10% of bank capital. 
Investment limited to 25% of firms’ capital. 
Also applies to land holding of the bank. 
CAMEL 
India  Lending limit of 15% of bank 
capital for single borrowers and 
40% of bank capital for group 
borrowers. In the case of 
infrastructure projects, 
5 percentage points more are 
granted. 
General provision 
rules. Advice to 
provision at time of 
credit event. Up to one 
year to provision for 
rehabilitation 
packages. 
  Investments up to 5% of total advances and 
20% of net worth. 
 
Off-site monitoring. 
Monitoring of real estate 
lending each month. 
On-site examination. 
Quarterly reporting. 
Korea  Lending limits of 20% of bank 
capital for single borrowers and 
25% of bank capital for group 
borrowers. Total of exposures 
greater than 10% of bank capital 
should not exceed five times 
bank capital. 
Provision rules make a 
distinction for 
household, credit card 
and other loans. 
  Lending to shareholders is limited to 25% of 
bank capital or a proportion of their 
shareholding. 
Lending to related parties is limited to 10% 
of bank capital. 
CAMELS: capital, 
assets, management, 
earnings, liquidity and 
stress testing. 
Malaysia  Lending limit of: 25% of bank 
capital for borrower; or 35% if 
private debt securities in bank 
portfolio. Total of exposures 
greater than 15% of bank capital 
cannot exceed 50% of total loan 
portfolio. 
Provisioning rules do 
not vary according to 
type of borrowing. 
Central bank owns 
and manages a credit 
registry. Banks report 
single loans but not 
credit assessment. 






























Country  Risk concentration  Provisions  Credit registry  Other prudential regulations  Supervisory 
assessment 
Singapore  Lending limit of 25% of bank 
capital for borrower. Total of 
exposures greater than 15% of 
bank capital cannot exceed 
50% of total loan portfolio. 
Loan loss provision 
computed from 




Association owns and 
manages a credit 




Access to information 
is restricted. 
Banks are not allowed to engage in non-
financial activities. They are also not allowed 
to invest in more than 10% of the share 
capital of/have significant influence over a 
company engaging in non-financial activities. 
Equity investment in a single company 
restricted to 2% of bank capital except in the 
case of financial companies where the 
acquisition has been approved by MAS. 
Total equity investment to 10% of capital. 
On-site examination. 
Monthly and quarterly 
reporting. 
Thailand  Lending limit of 25% of bank 
capital for borrower. Risk 
mitigation is limited to collateral 
in the form of government 
securities that reduce lending 
limits. 
Loan classification 
embedded in the law 




on a particular loan. 
There is a single credit 
bureau managed by a 
private company. All 
banks have chosen to 
report to it. Reporting 
for single borrowers 
and credit payment 
history is monthly. 
Cannot provide credit 
assessment report. 
Investments limited to 10% of companies’ 
shares and 20% of bank capital. 
Lending to related parties limited to 5% of 
bank capital, 50% of borrower’s net worth 
and 25% of its liabilities. Exception if lending 
carries government securities or certificates 
of deposit as collateral. 































Country  Risk concentration  Provisions  Credit registry  Other prudential regulations  Supervisory 
assessment 
Chile  Lending limit of 5% of borrowers’ 
equity. Can be raised to 10% if 
excess is in foreign currency for 
trade financing (exports) and up 
to 15% if the excess (in any 
currency) finances public works.  
Provisions are based 
on credit rating of 
borrower. Debtors can 
be pooled up in risk 
categories and 
provisioned as single 
borrowers according to 
risk characteristics. 
Central bank loan 
registry managed by 
supervisor. Monthly 
reporting of loans 
granted and credit 
rating. Rating may be 
individual or pooled. 
Lending to related parties is permitted but it 
should be granted under the same 
conditions as to non-related parties. 
Banks are not subject 
to concentration or 
exposure limits in the 
regulations. The 
supervisor will grant a 
better rating to a bank 
that diversifies risk. 
Colombia  Lending limit of 40% of 
borrowers’ net worth.  




according to months 
due (1-18 months). 
Banks report loans to 
supervisor on a 
monthly basis. Data 
comprise amounts, 
interest rate, loan 
quality and borrower. 
No public access to 
data. 
Lending to related parties is limited to 
10% of borrowers’ equity. Up to 25% if 
collateral for at least 5 pp is pledged. 




Mexico  Lending limits range from 12 to 
40% of bank capital for 
borrowers depending on the 
bank’s capital adequacy ratio 
(eg if it is between 10 and 
12% then it can lend up to 25%). 
Total of three largest exposures 
cannot exceed 100% of bank 
capital. Collateral increases 
borrowing limits up to 100% of 
bank capital. 
Provision rules for 
housing, consumer 
and commercial loans. 
Based on payment 
record and financial 
and collateral analysis. 
Internal models 
permitted. 
  Lending to related parties is limited to 
75% of banks’ capital. Investments limited to 
15% of business’ net worth. 
On-site supervision. 
Venezuela  Lending limit of 10% of bank 
capital for a single borrower and 
20% of bank capital for a group 
borrower. 
Provision rules for 
general lending and 
microfinance. 
  Lending to controlling interest forbidden. 


































Lending limit of 25% of bank 
capital for borrower. No limits to 
bond holdings of governments 
from OECD. Collateral 
admissible to reduce lending 
exposure (government bonds).  
Loan loss provisions 
from portfolio models. 
Different methodology 
for banks following 
IFRS and those that 
are not. Supervisor 
might request a capital 
deduction for 
differences between 
estimates based on 
portfolio losses and a 
fixed coefficient.  
Central bank manages 




financial information of 
borrower. Credit 
assessment is not 
reported. 
Lending limit of 20% of bank capital for 
controlling interest. 
Total lending to controlling interests cannot 
exceed eight times bank capital. 






Based on regulatory 
reporting. 
On-site examination. 
Poland  Lending and off-balance sheet 
claims cannot exceed 25% of 
bank capital. Total of exposures 
greater than 10% of bank capital 
cannot exceed eight times 
capital. Lending to OECD 
governments and banks is 
excluded (or lending secured 
against them). 
General provision 
rules. Application of 
portfolio model 
possible after prior 
approval by supervisor 
(no bank applied for 
it). 
Banks report to BIK 
(credit bureau) claims 
greater than 2.5% of 
bank capital (for large 
banks there is a loan 
size limit). Monthly 
update. Credit quality 
provided. Access only 
possible for central 
bank and supervisor. 
Lending limit of 20% of bank capital for 
related parties. 
Operational risk and internal controls. 
Off-site supervision 




greater than 10% of 
bank capital must be 
reported. 
Hungary  Lending limit of 25% of bank 
capital for borrower. Total of 
exposures greater than 10% of 
bank capital cannot exceed eight 
times capital. 
General provision 
rules. General risk 
provisions permitted. 
Private credit bureau. 
Banks must report 
their loans but not their 
credit assessment. 
Access is restricted to 
participating banks. 
Investments are limited to 15% of bank 
capital. Total exposure cannot exceed total 
bank capital. Excludes government bonds 
and debt securities; and investment in other 
financial firms (but these holdings are limited 
to 60% of bank capital). 
Limitations on lending to related parties. 
Disclosure required. 
Real estate limited to 5% of bank capital 





























Country  Risk concentration  Provisions  Credit registry  Other prudential regulations  Supervisory 
assessment 
Israel  Lending limit is scaled as a 
proportion of capital for: (i) large 
exposures; (ii) high leverage 
buyouts; (iii) industry 
concentration; (iv) exposure to 
LDC; and (v) debt in arrears. 
Collateral can be offset against 
exposure. 
General provision 
rules and special rules 
for housing loans. 
Centralised loan 
registry managed by 
the Bank of Israel. 
Proprietary use for 
supervision. Individual 
loans and financial 
information reported. 
Credit management, internal control and 
best practices. 
Operational risk and IT management. 
Off-site examination. 
On-site examination. 
Regulations play a 
major role in 
oversight. 
Russia  Individual or group borrowing is 
limited to 25% of bank capital. 
Total of exposures greater than 
5% of bank capital cannot 
exceed eight times capital. 
Provisions for 
individual loans based 
on degree of 
impairment. Collateral 
is not taken into 
account for loan 
classification but it is 
for provisioning. 
No centralised credit 
registry exists. There 
is oversight of credit 
bureaus by the central 
bank. 
Lending to related parties limited to 50% of 
bank capital. 
 




The central bank 
manages a loan 
registry. Banks report 
risk positions on a 
monthly basis. No 
credit assessment 
reported. Consumer 
credit lending is 
publicly available. 
Limits on lending to related parties.   
Source: BIS on national central banks.  
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Appendix B 






























Argentina                
Brazil                
Chile  Does not have a 
traditional deposit 
insurance system. 
Sight and time 
deposits 
guaranteed by the 
central bank 
na na na  No 
Colombia  Up to 75% of 
deposits or limit of 
COP 20 million 




Yes. Based on 
bank rating 
No No 




na No na  No 
Peru                





No No.  It  was 
extended in the 
crisis of 1994-95 
na 
China No  deposit 
insurance 
na na na  na 
India Limit  of 
INR 100,000 
(approx USD 2,300) 






USD 13,000); excl 
interbank and 
connected deposits; 
incl foreign and 
domestic currency 
0.05-0.14% 
(until the first 
year in which 



















deposits in HK 
offices are 
covered by the 
bank’s home 
jurisdiction 





Yes No  No  
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Indonesia Limited  0.10%  Not  yet,  plans 
to introduce 
this in 2007 
No No 
Korea Limit  of 







No No  No 
Malaysia  Limit of approx 
USD 15,000 





Not yet, plans 
to introduce 
this in 2006 
No No 
Philippines                
Thailand Currently  blanket 
guarantee but DIA 
to be formed to 
provide limited 
coverage 








Limited basis on 




No No  No 
Hungary Limit  of 
HUF 6 million 
(approx 
USD 29,000) for 
domestic currency 
and lower limit for 
foreign currency 





faces a higher 
charge 
No No 
Poland  Effective limit of 















by the Bank 
Guarantee 
Fund Council 













Israel  No formal deposit 
insurance scheme 
na na na  na  
BIS Papers No 28  117
 






























Russia Limit  of 
RUR 100,000 
(approx USD 3,500) 
Max 0.15% of 
deposits 
No   Banks which 
had a licence as 
of the date the 
Deposit 
Insurance Law 
came into effect 
but which have 





the central bank 
Unclear 
Saudi Arabia  No deposit 
insurance scheme 
na na na  na 













Note:  na = no answer or not applicable. 
Source: Central banks. 
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Appendix C 
Country Agency  responsible  What prompts corrective 




(in consultation with 
Financial Secretary) 
No specific criteria 
provided 
Order to cease operations 
Restriction of deposit-taking 
Restriction of other activities 
Appointment of adviser to management
Appointment of manager to take over 
India Reserve  Bank  of 
India 
Deterioration of financial 
strength: (i) capital 
adequacy ratio; (ii) non-
performing assets (net of 
provision); and (iii) return 
on assets 
Capitalisation plan (limit asset growth, 
dividend payment or new capital 
demand) 
Restriction of other activities (CD 
rollover, limit interbank borrowing, etc) 
Change of ownership 
Merger or liquidation 
Korea Financial  Supervisory 
Commission 
Capital adequacy ratio 





capital adequacy ratio 
below 2% and rating of 5 
Management improvement plan. If the 
supervisor approves the plan, it will 
support it with bad asset purchases or a 
capital injection 
Merger with another institution, 
appointment of receiver or suspension 
of business 
Malaysia  Central Bank of 
Malaysia 





Written commitments; letter of 
undertaking 
Restriction of lending activities 
Appointment of adviser to management
Change of management 
Filing of a petition of liquidation 
Singapore  Monetary Authority of 
Singapore 
No specific criteria 
provided 
Demand for bank to take corrective 
action [draw upon excess liquidity or 
reserves with MAS; order access to 
interbank market or parent bank 
support; restructure portfolio] 
Restrict operations 
Impose prudential conditions 
Appointment of adviser to management
Appointment of manager 
Takeover by another institution 
Revocation of licence/request to High 
Court for liquidation 
Thailand  Bank of Thailand and 
Ministry of Finance 





Restriction of business 
Bank liquidation 
Chile Banking  Supervisory 
Authority 





Change in financial contracts except 
sight deposits 
Liquidation (managed by BSA) 
Colombia Superintendency  of 
Banks. Network 
between MoF, SB & 
CB 
Troubled bank, at 
discretion of the 
supervisor 
Takeover by supervisor 
Liquidation 
1  In Korea, the bank supervisor issues ratings for individual institutions that range from 1 to 5 on a quarterly basis.  
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Country Agency  responsible  What prompts corrective 
action?  Actions 
Mexico  Pending approval  Capital adequacy ratio 
less than 8% 
Capital adequacy ratio 
less than 7% 
Capital adequacy ratio 
less than 4% 
Corrective plan aimed at capital 
increase. Suspension of dividend 
payments 
Restrictions on asset growth/new 
business 
Supervisor approval for new operations
Supervisor could also appoint 
management 
Bank resolution process launched with 
involvement of MoF, BC, SB and DI 
Venezuela Superintendency  of 
Banks and Financial 
Institutions 
Deficient capital adequacy 
ratio 
Access to central bank 
rediscount window 
Failure to comply with 
regulations 
Demand for capital increase 
Order to cease new lending and 
deposits 
Asset sale 
Change of management 
Closure of bank 
The supervisor enjoys great 
discretionary power to launch corrective 
action measures 




Czech National Bank  Shortcomings in the 
activities of the bank 
Capital less than two 
thirds adequacy ratio 
Stability of the banking 
system at risk 
Corrective plan 
Other possible actions: change of 
management, change in bank licence, 
fine, restriction or veto of power over 
transactions with related parties 
Demand for capital increase 
Prohibition of acquisition of risk assets 
Ceasing of lending to related parties 
Taking control of ailing bank 
Hungary Financial  Supervision 
Authority/Central 
Bank (MoU in 
existence) 
Failure to comply with 
capital adequacy ratio 
 
Poland Commission  for 
Banking Supervision 
Severe loss and threat of 
insolvency 
Losses that exceed half of 
any bank’s capital 
Corrective plan 
Appointment of adviser/controller 
Restriction of lending/deposit payment 
to related parties 
Calling of an extraordinary general 
meeting of shareholders 
Taking control of bank 
Taking control of bank away from 
shareholders 
Revocation of licence and closure of 
bank 
Israel  Bank of Israel 
(through the 
Supervisor of Banks) 






Rediscount window support 
Demand for rectification 
Order to cease certain operations 
Suspension of dividend payments 
Restriction of board’s decision-making 
power 
Appointment of management 
Appointment of bank examiner to 
advise management  
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Country Agency  responsible  What prompts corrective 
action?  Actions 
Russia  Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation 
Lack of compliance with 
legal framework 
Preventive: no threat to 
the interest of creditors 
and depositors 
Enforcement  
Fine for a value of up to 0.1% of capital
Prohibition of operations for up to six 
months 
Revocation of licence 








Troubled bank  Appointment of adviser to management
Order to cease management 
Order to cease lending/funding 
operations 
Revocation of licence (in coordination 
with Minister of Finance, who acts on 
recommendation from SAMA)  
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